Reports

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants filing with Social Security numbers (SSN) of deceased persons. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims filed with SSNs of deceased persons identified and referred by the OIG.

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was UI claimants filing with Social Security numbers (SSNs) of federal prisoners. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act Unemployment Insurance (UI)claims filed with SSNs of federal prisoners identified and referred by the OIG. 

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted the U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. Multistate claimants were the largest high-risk area. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA) the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act Unemployment Insurance (UI) claims identified and referred by the OIG.

In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants filing with suspicious email accounts. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims filed with suspicious email accounts identified and referred by the OIG.

Our audit objective was to answer the following questions: (1) What is Kansas’ process for distributing COVID relief funding?; and (2) Have Kansas’ distributions of COVID relief funding been appropriate? The scope of our work included examining the distribution process for CARES Act and American Rescue Plan Act funding. Additionally, we evaluated a sample of CARES Act expenditures made in 42 Kansas counties.

Our audit objective was to answer the question: what entities received Connectivity Emergency Response Grants and where were they located? We found that the Kansas Department of Commerce (Commerce) awarded $48.5 million in Connectivity Emergency Response Grant funds through 66 grants to all seven regions in Kansas with the largest amounts going to South Central, Southwest, and Northeast Kansas. We also found that Commerce denied some applications through its review process.

This audit report assessed what factors caused delays in the Kansas Department of Labor’s unemployment claims processing during the COVID-19 pandemic? To answer this question, we spoke with officials from the Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) and reviewed KDOL staffing, incident, and call center reports. This audit also includes an updated unemployment insurance fraud estimate. In February 2021 we released the first part of this audit. In that audit we reported a preliminary estimate of how much fraud could have occurred in Kansas in 2020. In this report, we used KDOL claims data from January...

As a result of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, State Medicaid programs have expanded options for telehealth services. Rapid expansion of telehealth may pose challenges for State agencies and providers, including State oversight of these services. Our objective is to determine whether State agencies and providers complied with Federal and State requirements for telehealth services under the national emergency declaration, and whether the States gave providers adequate guidance on telehealth requirements.

Title IV-E of the Social Security Act (the Act), as amended, authorizes the Federal Foster Care Program, which helps provide safe and stable out-of-home care for children until the children are safely returned home, placed permanently with adoptive families, or placed in other planned arrangements for permanency. Title IV-B of the Act authorizes Federal funding to States to promote flexibility in the development and expansion of coordinated child and family services programs. In response to COVID-19, on April 15, 2020, the Children's Bureau the operating division of the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) that administers the Title IV-B and Title IV-E programs at the Federal level—provided flexibility to State Title IV-E agencies related to (1) fingerprint-based criminal record checks requirements for prospective foster parents (allowing for name-based checks until fingerprint-based checks can safely be done), and (2) caseworker visit requirements (allowing videoconferencing visits to count toward the requirement that 50 percent of visits must occur in the child's home). On April 27, 2020, the Children's Bureau reminded States of additional flexibilities afforded by the Statute, including the authority to modify foster family licensing standards as long as the standards are applied to all of these placements in accordance with the requirements of the Statute. Additionally, States have the authority to set their own foster care maintenance payment rates including, at their own discretion, enhancing those rates for children who test positive for COVID-19.

We intend to survey all States and identify the States that adopted any new licensing regulations or policies and procedures as a result of the existing flexibilities in the Statute and the waivers provided by ACF. Based on the information gathered, we plan to identify three States and conduct separate audits to ensure foster care providers are safeguarding the health and safety of children during the COVID-19 pandemic and identify any vulnerabilities or gaps in policies or procedures that could place these children at risk. As part of these audits, we would ensure that criminal record checks for foster parents conducted via name-based checks were ultimately conducted through fingerprints whenever determined safe to do so.